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Abstract
This paper analyzes the role of standing facilities in the determination
of the demand for reserves in the overnight money market. In particular,
we study how the asymmetric nature of the deposit and lending facilities
could be used as a powerful policy tool for the simultaneous control of
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the role of standing facilities in the determination of the
demand for reserves in the overnight money market. In particular, we study
how the asymmetric nature of the deposit and lending facilities could be used
as a powerful policy tool for the simultaneous control of prices and quantities
in the market for daily funds.
The motivation for such a study originates from the monetary policy deci-
sions at the ECB and the Federal Reserve to respond to the current financial
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crisis. Both the ECB and the Federal Reserve confronted the crisis by decreasing
the rates of their refinancing operations but they felt obligated to complement
this measure with changes in their operational procedures in the search of a
new operational framework better suited for the new challenges associated with
the financial turmoil . The ECB decided on two modifications to its mone-
tary policy framework. First, on October 8th 2008, the corridor of standing
facilities was reduced from 200 to 100 basis points centered around the interest
rate of the main refinancing operations. Second, there were also adjustments in
the tender procedure of these operations. Starting from the operation settled
on October 15th 2008, the weekly main refinancing operations was carried out
through a fixed rate tender procedure with full allotment. These two measures
were designed to remain in place for as long as needed, and at least until the
end of the first maintenance period of 2009, on January 20th. The ECB wished
to communicate that it was going to steer liquidity towards balanced conditions
in a way which was consistent with the objective to keep short term rates close
to the interest rate on the main refinancing operation.1
Also on October 2008, the Federal Reserve made moves in a similar direction.
First, on October 6th, the Fed announced the payment of interest on depository
institutions’ required and excess reserves balances. In particular, the interest
rate for the excess reserves, which, in practice, is equivalent to a deposit rate,
was fixed at 75 basis points below the target federal funds rate. The Board
claimed that the payment of interest on excess reserves balances was going to
give the Federal Reserve greater scope to use its lending programs to address
conditions in credit markets while also maintaining the federal funds rate close to
the target. Second, on October 22nd, the deposit rate was changed to 35 basis
points below the target federal funds rate. Because since 2002 the discount
window functions in practice as a lending facility, with the discount rate fixed
at 50 basis points above the target for the federal funds rate, these decisions
were intended to reduce the corridor for the overnight rate. In fact, as it was
argued by the Board, a narrower spread between the target funds rate and the
deposit rate would help foster trading in the funds market at rates closer to the
target rate.
In the Euro area, most of the attention of the press and the first reactions of
the markets participants came from the measure related to the full allotment.
Having full allotment on fix-rate open market operations was seen as a direct
measure to control market rates. On the other hand, because overnight rates
will never be above the lending rate or below the deposit rate, the reduction
of the spread between the lending and deposit rate was considered an obvious
way to control interest rates. But this measure was mainly regarded as a purely
technical point without much further implications on the behavior of market
participants.
However, according to the ECB, the spread between the lending and deposit
rates may have been relevant for the behavior of counterparties in the Eurosys-
tem monetary policy operations. Apparently, agents reacted to the reduction in
1See the ECB press release of October 8th, 2008.
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this spread by asking in the main refinancing operations for much more reserves
that they otherwise would have needed. This excess of reserves was then de-
posited in the deposit facility. To correct this situation, on January 15th 2009,
the October 8th decision was revoked and the width of the corridor between the
rates of the standing facilities was set to be 200 basis points again.2
In this paper we argue that, although this line of reasoning might not be
wrong, the determination of the demand for excess reserves is somewhat more
elaborated. First, we look at data and conclude that there is no clear cut relation
between the demand for excess reserves and the amplitude of the corridor formed
by the lending and deposit rates. The data shows how several factors that
potentially could have an effect on the demand for reserves changed together
with the width of the interest rate corridor. Second, we construct a model of
reserve demand determination. We illustrate how the demand for funds depends
on the position of the main refinancing rate within the band formed by the rates
of the standing facilities and not on the width of that corridor. One conclusion
of the model is that the position of the main refinancing rate with respect to
the lending and deposit rates can be used as a monetary policy tool to control
simultaneously interest rates and liquidity conditions. Furthermore, since March
2004 the ECB has been conducting fine-tuning operations at the end of the
reserve maintenance periods to provide or drain any liquidity differential with
respect to the ECB’s estimated balanced reserve position. We use the model
to understand the effect of this type of operations on the demand for excess
reserves.
In previous work, we have demonstrated the important role standing facilities
play in shaping the demand for reserves in “normal” times. Pérez Quirós and
Rodríguez Mendizábal [16] and Gaspar, Pérez Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal
[12] showed that the standing facilities have an important role in determining the
distribution of overnight rates within the reserve maintenance period. The main
assumption in these papers is a neutral monetary policy defined as the liquidity
the system needs to fulfill reserve requirements. In this paper we adapt this
previous framework to include the distress associated with a period of turmoil
as the one experienced by financial markets after the summer of 2007 together
with the existence of fine-tuning operations on the last day of the maintenance
periods.
Obviously we are not the first ones in analyzing the role of the institu-
tional framework for the dynamics of money markets. Starting from the semi-
nal paper by Hamilton [13] where he analyzes possible reasons for the departure
from the martingale hypothesis of the overnight rate in the US, different papers
have studied the role of several elements of the monetary policy implementation
framework. For example, Demiralp and Artuc [4] analyze the removal in 2003 of
the stigma associated with the discount window in the US. For the Eurosystem,
Ayuso and Repullo [1] and [2] analyze the optimal behavior of banks in the open
market operations as a function of the type of auction design by the ECB and
explain the overbidding behavior of banks in the first half of 2000. Valimaki
2See ECB [11], page 34.
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[17] investigates the changes introduced in March 2004, namely, the timing of
the reserve maintenance period to make them coincide with the meeting of the
Governing Council and the reduction in the maturity of the main refinancing
operations. He points out the importance of the size of the open market opera-
tions for the uncertainty of the outcome of the liquidity auction and links it to
the increase in the price of the bids. His theoretical results are corroborated,
among others, by the empirical applications of Linzert and Schmidt [15]. Fi-
nally, the implications of the recent financial crisis on the Euro money markets
are analyzed in Cassola and Morana [3], Eisenschmidt, Hirsch and Linzert [6] as
well as Eisenschmidt and Tapking [5]. In all these cases, the results are mainly
empirical, evaluating the effect of the financial turmoil on the spread between
the Eonia and the main refinancing operation rates or on the bidding behav-
ior of the banks. These papers also try to show that the spreads between the
secured and unsecured markets can not be explained just by higher credit risk.
As far as we know, not a single paper has formally studied the role of
the standing facilities in the current crisis although Goodhart [14] has already
pointed out the need for a careful analysis of the asymmetry in the interest
rate corridor as a policy instrument. First he indicates that the parameters of
the corridor “could become a flexible and subtle further instrument” of mone-
tary policy so that “treating these parameters as a constant would be a waste
of a good instrument”. In fact, for the current crisis at hand he recommends
that “before the recovery has properly begun, and while the financial system
remains fragile [...] the asymmetric bias should (penalize) reserve build up and
(encourage) borrowing from the Fed”.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the recent devel-
opments in the Euro area money markets that motivate our work. Section 3
presents the theoretical model and its solution. Finally, section 4 concludes and
discuss the policy implications of the results
2 Recent developments in Euro-area money mar-
kets
In this section we provide some evidence to evaluate different explanations for
the behavior of the demand for reserves in the Euro-area during the recent
turmoil in financial markets. Figure 1 shows the daily use of the deposit facility
as a percentage of total reserve requirements between January 3rd, 2007 and
September 23rd, 2009. The figure also includes the two periods for which the
width of the interest rate corridor formed by the lending and deposit rate has
been below 200 basis points. The first period is represented by an area with
vertical lines and goes from October 9th, 2008 until January 21st, 2009. In this
period the interest rate corridor was 100 basis points wide. The second period
started on May 13th, 2009 and runs until the end of the sample. This period is
shown as an area with horizontal lines. In this case, the difference between the
rates of the standing facilities was 150 basis points. These areas are shown in
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all the figures below.3
Between the beginning of the sample and September 25th, 2008, reserve
balances at the deposit facility has averaged 0.26 percent of reserve requirements
with a maximum of 5.8 percent.4 Then, by September 30th of that year this
ratio increased to 48 percent of reserve requirements and stayed around 102
percent during the period between October 9th, 2008 and January 21st, 2009
when the spread between the lending and deposit rates was 100 basis points.
Since mid-January 2009 this ratio has been decreasing reaching a minimum of
3.4 percent on June 24th, 2009. However, on June 25th, 2009, the use of the
deposit facility started to rise again and reached its historical maximum of 145
percent of reserve requirements on July 3rd, 2009.5
Figure 2 presents the standing amounts of reserves injected through open
market operations as a fraction of reserve requirements. Until the beginning
of October 2008 this number fluctuated around 228 percent of reserve require-
ments. Then, between October 9th, 2008 and January 21st, 2009 it increased so
that the average over this period was 364 percent. Since February 2009 this ra-
tio has been decreasing until June 25th, 2009, when it raised again and reached
411 percent. This figure also includes the amount of autonomous factors as a
fraction of reserve requirements. This series increased from a level of around 110
percent to just around 170 percent on October 2008 which means that changes
in the behavior of autonomous factors cannot account for the larger recourse to
the open market operations. Thus, these figures suggest that the increase in the
use of the deposit facility has been financed through bigger amounts allotted at
the open market operations of the ECB.
As pointed out in the Introduction, a natural explanation for the behavior
of reserve demand has to do with changes in the cost of using the deposit
facility. Because this cost is measured by the spread between the rate of the main
refinancing operation and the deposit rate, in the two periods when this spread
has decreased the appeal of the deposit facility has increased. This has resulted
in larger reserve demands at the open market operations given the full allotment
policy of the ECB after October 15th, 2009. Although this explanation might
be correct, it may not capture all the factors behind the demand of reserves.
A careful look at Figure 1 suggests that there ought to be other important
elements to account for the behavior of reserve demand in the euro area. First,
the increase in the use of the deposit facility does not exactly coincide with the
reduction of the amplitude of the interest rate corridor. Banks started to move
funds from their current accounts to the deposit facility in a significant manner
3 In this paper we do not describe the institutional framework of the Euro area monetary
policy. Interested readers that need some background in the Euro area monetary policy
implementation rules should read European Central Bank [10]. For a description of the two
major recent changes, the one in March 2004 and the one in October 2008, see ECB [7], ECB
[8] and ECB [9].
4This value was reached on September 9th, 2008 which was the end of a reserve maintenance
period.
5On June 25th, 2009, the ECB started conducting liquidity-providing main refinancing
operations with a year maturity. The larger use of the deposit facilities could be due to
expectations of future rate increases.
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around two weeks before October 9th, 2008. Second, after the amplitude of the
band went back to be 200 basis points on January 22nd, 2009, we witnessed
a very gradual reduction in the use of the deposit facility, nothing comparable
with the sudden peak observed on October 9th, 2008. Third, this fall in the
recourse to the deposit facility occurred even when the cost of using this facility
dropped again on May 13th, 2009. Finally, as suddenly as in October 2009,
the deposit facility was again heavily used after June 25th, 2009, the day of the
settlement of the first of the 1-year refinancing operations to provide liquidity,
decided on the May 7th 2009 meeting of the Governing Council, although at
this time the spread between the lending and deposit rate stayed constant at
150 basis points.
One possible element missing in the explanation above is the evolution of
the risk involved in interbank lending as perceived by market participants. One
way to think about the factors behind the demand of reserves is that market
participants use the main refinancing operations and the deposit facility as a
storage device in response to their perceptions of the risk involved in interbank
lending. One commonly used measure of risk is the spread between the Euribor
and the Eurepo at same maturities. The Euribor is the rate of uncollateralized
loans in the interbank market while the Eurepo is the rate of the corresponding
collateralized loan. Figure 3 shows the difference between the Euribor and the
Eurepo at the 12-month maturity for the same sample period as in Figures 1
and 2. We can see how this spread started to rise at the end of August 2007
with a dramatic peak on October 2008. After moving around values close to
2 percentage points, the spread between the Euribor and Eurepo had a sharp
decrease on December 5th, 2008 and it has been declining since then. Therefore,
as the perception of market risk significantly increased on October, 2008, finan-
cial institutions responded by raising their demand for excess reserves. This was
achieved by larger bids in the main refinancing operation. These larger amounts
allotted by the ECB were then deposited at the deposit facility. Furthermore,
the simultaneous narrowing of the interest rate corridor exacerbated the use of
the demand for excess reserves and the use of the deposit facility as the cost of
using this storage device decreased.
Again, although this explanation might be correct, a closer look at Figures 1
and 3 suggests that there still ought to be other important elements to account
for the behavior of reserve demand in the euro area. First, perceived risk had
already increased in a significant manner a year before market participants
began using the deposit facility in sizable amounts. Furthermore, the conditions
regarding the width of the interest rate corridor and the prize of risk around
June and July of 2008 are basically the same as in March and April of 2009
but the use of the deposit facility is very different. Finally, between May 13th
and July 7th of 2009, the difference between the lending and deposit rates
stayed constant and the prize of risk decreased. However, the use of the deposit
facility increased substantially.6 From this evidence we conclude that neither the
6See footnote 5 for a possible explanation of the increase in the use of the deposit facility
after June 25th, 2009.
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difference between the lending and deposit rates nor the market’s perceptions
on risk seem to provide satisfactory explanations of the behavior of the demand
for excess reserves.
Another important element that might affect the demand for reserves might
be related to the existence of fine-tuning operations on the last days of the
reserve maintenance periods. The ECB has conducted a liquidity draining fine-
tuning operation on the last day of each of the 11 reserve maintenance periods
existent between November 2008 and September 2009. An important question
is whether these fine tuning operations have drained all the excess liquidity in
the system. To answer this question we use as a measure of the excess liquidity
in the system the recourse to the deposit facility the previous to last day of the
maintenance period. Figure 4 plots the amount of drainage, that is, the size of
those 11 fine tuning operations, as well as the changes in the use of the deposit
facility and in the aggregate current account of the system on the last day of the
maintenance period. We normalize these quantities by our measure of excess
liquidity so that all these numbers appear as fractions of the use of the deposit
facility on the previous to last day of the maintenance period. For example, on
the 7th of April of 2009, a fine tuning was done with a size of approximately
120 percent of the “excess liquidity” in the system, proxied with the use of the
deposit facility on the 6th of April of 2009. Although the drainage of reserves
was larger than the excess liquidity, this open market operation reduced the
use of the deposit facility by just 60 percent. The other 60 percent implied a
reduction of the current accounts of credit institutions in the ECB.7 We can
see how the drainage of liquidity is always larger in absolute value than the
reduction rate in the use of the deposit facility, and, sometimes, the drainage
reaches values larger than 1. This means that the drainage is larger than the
outstanding balance of the deposit facility on the previous to last day of the
maintenance period. However, the decrease rate in the deposit facility never
reaches 1 so that there is always a significative fraction of use of the deposit
facility on the last day. As Figure 4 shows, a significative part of the drainage
of liquidity is obtained through reductions in current accounts. All these 11
operations were conducted through variable rate tenders. Therefore, even with
fine tuning operations on the last day, there is an excess demand for reserves
after the financial turmoil that can not be drained by the ECB.
Overnight market rates provide further evidence on the behavior of credit
institutions. Figure 5 plots the spread between the Eonia and the rate of the
main refinancing operations. We can see how this spread has been systematically
negative after October 14th, 2008. This observation supports the idea that there
is too much liquidity in the system.
Finally, for completeness, Figure 6 plots the use of the marginal lending
facility over required reserves. To compare with Figure 1, it maintains the
same range of values for the vertical axis. Unlike the use of the deposit facil-
7The variations in deposits and the variations in the current account do not always add to
the size of the operation because variation in autonomous factors also contribute to changes
in liquidity conditions. On those days, however, the contribution of autonomous factors is
negligible.
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ity, recourse to the marginal lending facility has stayed in much smaller levels.
The maximum value over the whole sample is just 13 percent with an average
between October 9th, 2008 and January 21st, 2009 of 2.79 percent of reserve
requirements.
In this paper we do not seek to provide an explanation of the observed be-
havior of the demand for excess reserves. Rather, we take as given the increase
in demand for reserves associated with periods of turmoil in financial markets.
We then construct a model in which, in such scenario, commercial banks have
an incentive to demand sizable amounts of excess reserves at the main refinanc-
ing operations. Naturally, this state of affairs does not represent a desirable
situation. On the one hand, funds injected by the central bank do not reach
the money market and, therefore, cannot be channeled to those institutions who
need them most. On the other hand, the central bank looses control on liquid-
ity conditions as these funds can be put back in the market whenever financial
institutions decide to do so.
We use the model to show how the demand for funds in the market depends
on the relative position of the main refinancing rate with respect to the lending
and deposit rates. In this sense, we illustrate how the demand for reserves is
independent of the width of symmetric corridors around the main refinancing
rate. One conclusion of the model is that the central bank can control the
demand for reserves and the use of the deposit facility by carefully choosing the
position of the main refinancing rate within the corridor defined by the rates
of the standing facilities. Furthermore, keeping constant the amplitude of this
corridor ensures the same degree of control of market rates. Thus, the width
together with the degree of asymmetry of the interest rate band can be used as
two monetary policy tools to control simultaneously interest rates and liquidity
conditions in the interbank market. Finally, as the fine-tuning operation at
the end of the maintenance period affects the expected profits from reserve
management perceived by market participants, we also show the role that such
operations have in shaping the demand for excess reserves.
3 The theoretical model
3.1 The setup
This section presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Eurosystem
overnight money market. The main features of the model are based on Pérez
Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal [16]. Assume an economy inhabited by a
central bank and a continuum of commercial banks with measure one. These
commercial banks maintain deposits, called current accounts or reserves, with
the central bank in order to fulfil reserve requirements and payments responsibil-
ities. Every day an interbank market opens where banks can exchange reserves
through loans with an overnight maturity.
When deciding how much funds to loan or to borrow from the market, banks
consider the constraints associated with the operational framework of the cen-
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tral bank. This framework is composed of three elements. The first one refers to
certain restrictions on the current accounts hold by commercial banks. Reserve
balances of commercial banks cannot be negative by the end of each day and
the accumulated balance over each reserve maintenance period has to be large
enough to meet required reserves, that is, it cannot be smaller than a number
R > 0. This number R corresponds to the level of required reserves and is
pre-determined. The reserve maintenance period has a length of T = 2 days.
The second element consists of two standing facilities provided by the central
bank. There is a lending facility where banks can borrow funds at the interest
rate il and a deposit facility where banks can deposit funds at the rate id. These
facilities are always available to commercial banks. The third element includes
the central bank’s open market operations (OMOs). We assume there is a main
refinancing operation performed at the beginning of the reserve maintenance
period. This OMO has a maturity of T = 2 days. There also exists the possi-
bility of an overnight fine-tuning operation at the very end of the maintenance
period. From the individual point of view of commercial banks this fine-tuning
operation occurs with probability pf . If performed, the fine-tuning operation
may be liquidity absorbing or providing depending on the aggregate liquidity
conditions. Both OMOs allot bids fully and are conducted as fixed rate tenders
at the rate io, with id < io < il.
The theoretical design of the fine-tuning operation is novel and deserves
further explanation. We wanted to model two features of this operation. First,
the ECB does not always perform these operations so that from the point of
an individual bank there is uncertainty about the possibility to accommodate
individual reserve imbalances at the end of the maintenance period. On the
other hand, these operations, when performed are usually done through variable
rate tenders.8 This means the rate at which the fine-tuning operation is settled
should be between the rate of the main refinancing operation and the rate of the
corresponding standing facility depending on whether the operation is liquidity
draining or providing. As will be seen below, the subjective probability pf
can be interpreted to capture this feature of the operational framework of the
Eurosystem.
The problem for each bank j ∈ [0, 1] is as follows. Because each bank
starts every maintenance period without funds, and because the OMO has a
maturity of T days, each maintenance period is an independent entity so we
can concentrate on the decisions made by banks on an isolated maintenance
period. As they start day 1 with no reserves, at the beginning of that day
each bank has to decide how much reserves, aj1, to get from the OMO of the
central bank. Once this decision is taken, a perfectly competitive overnight
interbank market opens every day where banks decide how much funds to loan
out or borrow at an interest rate it. Banks make these decisions in order to
maximize their expected sum of profits from reserve management over all T
days of the maintenance period. Apart from aggregate variables, the information
8As explained in section 2, this has been the case for all the fine-tuning operations per-
formed at the end of the reserve maintenance periods between November 2008 and September
2009.
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needed by an individual bank j to make these decisions is summarized by its
reserve position sjt = (a
j
t , r
j
t ). This position is defined by its current account
at the beginning of each day, ajt , and the amount of reserves bank j has to
accumulate from day t until day T to satisfy its reserve requirement, also know
as its deficiency, rjt . Let m
j
t and b
j
t be the amount of funds kept by a bank and
the ones loaned out in the market at day t, respectively. These magnitudes have
to satisfy
mjt + b
j
t = a
j
t , (1)
and
mjt ≥ 0.
After the market closes, bank j receives a liquidity shock, εjt . If ε
j
t is positive,
the balance of the bank increases and if it is negative the balance decreases. We
assume these shocks are i.i.d. across time and banks and are distributed ac-
cording to a distribution G with mean 0 and standard deviation σ. At the same
time, we want to model the subjective perceptions by individual banks about
the possibility of facing tough liquidity conditions in the course of the current
reserve maintenance period. This ex-ante subjective perception of aggregate
liquidity conditions can be summarized by the possibility of a permanent ag-
gregate liquidity drain equal to µ = e < 0. The subjective probability assigned
to this event is pµ. On the other hand, the reserve maintenance period may
be characterized by normal payment responsibilities. In this case there is no
liquidity drain so that µ = 0. Banks assign a probability 1 − pµ to this event.
This aggregate uncertainty is realized on day 1 after the OMO has taken place
and before the interbank market opens.
We assume that interests on interbank lending are paid separately so they are
not capitalized.9 This assumption means that current accounts at the beginning
of day 2 evolve exogenously according to10
aj2 = a
j
1 + ε
j
1 + µ. (2)
On the other hand, reserve deficiencies on day 2, rj2, that is, the level of the
current account of bank j at the end of day 2 needed to satisfy its reserve
requirement, evolve as
rj2 = max
{
0, R−max
[
0,mj1 + ε
j
1
]}
. (3)
That is, the reserve balance of the bank at the end of day 1 (mj1 + ε
j
1) is
accumulated only if it is positive and deficiencies cannot be negative. Thus,
what matters is fulfilling the requirement of accumulating R reserves over the
T = 2 days and not how much reserves are accumulated on each particular
9 Interest rates from exchanging reserves in the interbank market are usually paid at the
end of the maintenance period. Thus, they are part of the profits of the banks but should not
affect the daily evolution of the beginning-of-day reserves.
10The reader should remember that trading in the market is done with an overnight matu-
rity. This means that the intertemporal evolution of reserves for an individual bank does not
depend on the decision made about mjt or b
j
t but only on the realization of the shock 
j
t .
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day. Notice, deficiencies are nonincreasing over time. Furthermore, once the
deficiency is zero, additional reserves are accumulated in excess. We refer to
this situation by saying that a bank is “locked-in”. In other words, zero is an
absorbing state for deficiencies.
3.2 The problem of bank j at T = 2
The model is solved by backward induction. With this method, we first solve
the problem for all possible individual and aggregate states and dates starting
at day T = 2 and working backwards towards the beginning of the maintenance
period. This information allows us to find bids in the fine-tuning operation as
well as the demand or supply of funds in the interbank market for every bank
on every day and to find the sequence of equilibrium rates conditioned on the
realization of the aggregate state. Once we know the market clearing rates we
are able to compute the profits from having reserves through the maintenance
period. Notice these sequences of profits and equilibrium rates are conditioned
on the initial level of reserves for each bank, aj1, j ∈ [0, 1], that were obtained
at the open market operation at the beginning of day 1. Then it is possible
to see how many reserves banks are willing to obtain from the central bank by
comparing the OMO rate with the expected value of those funds throughout
the maintenance period.
3.2.1 The fine-tuning operation
During T = 2, bank j decides to leave mj2 in the current account at the central
bank. Then, it is hit by the liquidity shock εj2. This means that by the time the
fine-tuning operation occurs, bank j has a current account balance of mj2 + ε
j
2
and a deficiency of rj2. With this information, bank j knows whether it will
satisfy the reserve requirement and will have excess reserves or not. Let fj2 be
the bid at the fine-tuning operation. The end-of-maintenance period costs of
reserve management, cj2(m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2, f
j
2 ), are
cj2(m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2, f
j
2 ) = i
ofj2 + i
l(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2 − f
j
2 )I
[
rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2 + f
j
2
]
+id(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2 − f
j
2 )I
[
rj2 ≤ m
j
2 + ε
j
2 + f
j
2
]
,
with I[x] being an indicator function that takes value 1 when the statement
in brackets is true. The first term on the right hand side represents the costs
of borrowing from the central bank at the interest rate io. If the central bank
conducts a liquidity draining fine-tuning OMO fj2 would be negative and that
term would represent a revenue for bank j. The second term is the costs of using
the marginal lending facility at the rate il. This happens when accumulated
reserves are not enough to satisfy the reserve requirement (rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2 + f
j
2 ).
The third term is the revenues from recourse to the deposit facility at the rate
id. This happens when the bank has excess reserves at the end of the day
(rj2 ≤ m
j
2 + ε
j
2 + f
j
2 ). Given the rates of the standing facilities (i
d and il) and
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the one of the fine-tuning operation (id < io < il), bank j will always prefer to
use the OMO rather than the facilities to balance its current account.
The only constraint bank j faces is that the sign of the fine-tuning operation
should agree with its liquidity needs. The central bank decides whether the fine-
tuning operation drains or provides liquidity attending at aggregate liquidity
conditions by comparing aggregate current accounts, A2,
11
A2 =
∫
aj2dj, (4)
with aggregate deficiencies, R2,
R2 =
∫
rj2dj. (5)
Thus, if there is an aggregate shortage of liquidity, i.e. if A2−R2 < 0, the fine-
tuning operation will be liquidity providing and the bid of bank j is constrained
to be positive, i.e. fj2 ≥ 0. On the contrary, if there is an aggregate excess of
liquidity, i.e. if A2−R2 > 0, the fine-tuning operation will be liquidity draining
and the bid of bank j is constrained to be negative, i.e. fj2 ≤ 0. Finally in
the case of balanced liquidity conditions, i.e. if A2 − R2 = 0, there will be no
fine-tuning operation and the bid of bank j will have to be zero, i.e. fj2 = 0.
It is important to notice that aggregate liquidity conditions are endogenous as
they depend on the bids at the initial main refinancing operation.
The problem of bank j in the fine tuning operation is to decide the bid to
minimize costs of reserve management. This problem can be written as
V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2) = min
f
j
2
cj2(m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2, f
j
2 )
subject to
fj2 ≥ 0 if A2 −R2 < 0
fj2 = 0 if A2 −R2 = 0
fj2 ≤ 0 if A2 −R2 > 0.
Given the linearity of the objective function the optimal decision will be
at a corner, either fj2 = 0 or f
j
2 = r
j
2 − m
j
2 − ε
j
2, depending on whether the
reserve position of bank j coincides or not with the aggregate reserve position
of the market as a whole. Thus, if there is an aggregate reserve deficiency,
A2 − R2 < 0, so that the fine-tuning operation is liquidity providing, bank j
will bid zero, fj2 = 0, if it has excess reserves (r
j
2 ≤ m
j
2 + ε
j
2) or all its reserve
shortage, f j2 = r
j
2−m
j
2− ε
j
2, if itself does not have enough reserves to satisfy its
requirement (rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2). In that case, the minimized costs are
V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2 < 0) = i
o(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2)I
[
rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
+id(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2)I
[
rj2 ≤m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
, (6)
11 In what follows, capital letters refer to aggregate variables.
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and the partial derivative with respect to the current account holdings of the
bank is
∂V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2 < 0)
∂mj2
= −ioI
[
rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
− idI
[
rj2 ≤ m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
.
On the other hand, if there are aggregate excess reserves, A2 − R2 > 0, so
that the fine-tuning operation is liquidity draining, bank j will bid all its excess
reserves, fj2 = r
j
2−m
j
2−ε
j
2, if it has reserves over its requirement (r
j
2 ≤m
j
2+ε
j
2)
or zero, f j2 = 0, if itself does not have enough reserves to satisfy its requirement
(rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2). In that case, the minimized costs are
V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2 > 0) = i
l(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2)I
[
rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
+io(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2)I
[
rj2 ≤m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
,
and the partial derivative with respect to the current account holdings of the
bank is
∂V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2 > 0)
∂mj2
= −ilI
[
rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
− ioI
[
rj2 ≤m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
.
Finally, with balanced liquidity conditions, A2−R2 > 0, there is no fine-tuning
operation, f j2 = 0. In that case, the minimized costs are
V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2 = 0) = i
l(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2)I
[
rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
+id(rj2 −m
j
2 − ε
j
2)I
[
rj2 ≤m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
,
and the partial derivative with respect to the current account holdings of the
bank is
∂V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2 = 0)
∂mj2
= −ilI
[
rj2 > m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
− idI
[
rj2 ≤m
j
2 + ε
j
2
]
.
Notice what the fine-tuning operation does. It changes the marginal value
of funds at the end of the reserve maintenance period when the ECB computes
reserve requirements. In this sense, if the individual bank reserve position coin-
cides with the aggregate one, the existence of the fine-tuning operation deviates
the opportunity cost of funds from the corresponding standing facility (il or id
depending on whether the operation is liquidity providing or draining, respec-
tively) to the one of the open market operation (io).
3.2.2 The interbank market at t = 2
Because all banks start identical, they will demand the same amount of reserves
at the initial OMO (aj1 = A1, for all j ∈ [0, 1]) and there will be no borrowing
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or lending at the first day of the maintenance period (bj1 = 0, for all j ∈ [0, 1]).
This means that the distribution of individual states (aj2, r
j
2 for all j ∈ [0, 1])
is exogenous at t = 2 and will only depend on the particular distribution of
individual shocks, which includes the realization of the aggregate liquidity drain
µ, either e < 0 with probability pµ or 0 with probability 1−pµ. The distribution
of initial reserves at t = 2 is given by
aj2 = A1 + µ+ ε
j
1,
and is distributed according to the distribution G but with mean A1 + µ and
standard deviation σ. The determination of individual deficiencies is as follows:
rj2 =

R, for banks for which εj1 ≤ −A1 − µ,
R−A1 − ε
j
1, for banks for which −A1 − µ < ε
j
1 ≤ R−A1 − µ,
0, for banks for which R−A1 − µ < ε
j
1.
This means that the distribution of individual deficiencies at T = 2, is described
by a truncated distribution. The truncation points are rj2 = R and r
j
2 = 0 with
mass equal to
prob(rj2 = R) = G (−A1 − µ) ,
and
prob(rj2 = 0) = 1−G (R−A1 − µ) ,
respectively, where G(x) represents the distribution of liquidity shocks. No-
tice the joint distribution of individual states depends on the initial amount of
reserves allotted at the main refinancing OMO, A1.
Let pij2(a
j
2, r
j
2;µ) be the profits of bank j at day T = 2. Given the realization
of the aggregate liquidity drain, µ, and the individual state of the bank, sj2 =
(aj2, r
j
2), the decision problem at the interbank market can be written as follows.
Bank j will decide on the supply of funds in the market, bj2 = a
j
2 − m
j
2, to
maximize expected profits
max
b
j
2
E2
[
pij2(s
j
2;µ)
]
. (7)
In this expression, profits are equal to
pij2(s
j
2;µ) = i2(µ)b
j
2 − p
fV f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2)
−(1− pf )V f2 (m
j
2 + ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2 −R2 = 0). (8)
The first term on the right hand side represents the revenues (costs) of lending
(borrowing) in the market at the interest rate i2(µ). In that term we wanted to
make explicit the idea that the equilibrium rate depends on the realization of
the aggregate liquidity shock, µ. The second term and third term represent the
end-of-maintenance period costs of liquidity management. With probability pf
there will be a fine-tuning operation whose cost depends on the current account
holding of the bank, mj2 + ε
j
2, and its deficiency, r
j
2, as well as on the aggregate
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liquidity conditions, A2−R2. With probability 1−pf there will be no fine-tuning
operation. From an individual point of view this event is captured by the costs
in case aggregate liquidity conditions are balanced, V f2 (m
j
2+ε
j
2, r
j
2;A2−R2 = 0).
As the particular solution depends on the aggregate liquidity conditions,
we can solve the problem for the three cases considered so far. In case of an
aggregate liquidity shortage, A2−R2 < 0, substituting (1) and (6) in (8) yields
expected profits equal to
E2
[
pij2(s
j
2;µ)
]
= i2(µ)b
j
2 − i
d(rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2)
[
1−G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)]
−
[
pf io + (1− pf )il
]
(rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2)G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
+
[
pf io + (1− pf )il
] rj2+bj2−aj2∫
−∞
εg (ε) dε
+id
∞∫
r
j
2
+b
j
2
−a
j
2
εg (ε) dε, (9)
where g(x) is the density function of the liquidity shock. The first order condi-
tion for a maximum is
i2(µ) = i
d +
[
pf io + (1− pf )il − id
]
G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
. (10)
This expression determines the supply of funds by bank j on the last day of
the reserve maintenance period, bj2, as a function of its state, summarized by
its current account balance at the beginning of the day, aj2, and its reserve
deficiency, rj2.
12 The interpretation is simple. Banks will supply funds in the
market up to the point where the marginal value of an extra unit of liquidity
equates its expected opportunity cost. The marginal return is represented by
the market rate, i2(µ). The marginal opportunity cost depends on the situation
the bank ends up at the end of the day. In this sense, two events can happen.
On the one hand, the bank may satisfy the reserve requirement and end up
with excess reserves. This event happens with probability 1−G(rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2).
In such a case, the bank will deposit the excess reserves at the deposit facility
which implies a low opportunity cost equal to the deposit rate id. On the other
hand, the bank may not satisfy the reserve requirement and will have to obtain
the necessary funds from the central bank. This event happens with probability
G(rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2). In such a case the opportunity cost will depend on whether
there is a fine-tuning operation or not. With probability pf there is a liquidity
providing fine-tuning operation and the cost of funds would be io.13 With
12This expression assumes an interior solution. If b̂j
2
represents the solution of that expres-
sion, the decision on supply of funds have to satisfy bj
2
= min
[
b̂
j
2
,max
(
0, a
j
2
)]
.
13Remember we are conditioning on the event of an aggregate liquidity shortage so that the
fine-tuning operation is liquidity providing.
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probability 1 − pf there is no fine-tuning operation and the bank will need to
go to the lending facility to obtain funds at the cost il. Here we can see the role
of the probability pf in interpreting the fine-tuning operation in the model as
performed through a variable rate tender. The ex-ante marginal cost of funds
in case the bank finds itself with a liquidity shortage will be between io and il
as it is the case with the variable rate operations.
From (9) it is easy to see that the marginal value of an additional unit of
reserves is
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂aj2
= id +
[
pf io + (1− pf )il − id
]
G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
. (11)
At the same time, the marginal value of an additional unit of deficiency is
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂rj2
= −
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂aj2
. (12)
The intuition of this expression is easy. Starting the last day with an extra
unit of deficiency means not being able to loan a unit of reserves in the market.
The marginal cost of this change is the marginal value of a unit of reserves.
Expressions (11) and (12) will be used below.
The other cases are handled similarly and have analogous intuitions. In case
of aggregate excess liquidity, A2 −R2 < 0, substituting (1) and (6) in (8) and
taking first order conditions yields
i2(µ) =
[
pf io + (1− pf )id
]
+
[
il − pf io − (1− pf )id
]
G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
, (13)
with
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂aj2
= id +
[
pf io + (1− pf )il − id
]
G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
(14)
and
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂rj2
= −
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂aj2
. (15)
Finally, when there are balanced liquidity conditions, A2−R2 < 0, substituting
(1) and (6) in (8) and taking first order conditions yields
i2(µ) = i
d + (il − id)G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
, (16)
with
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂aj2
= id + (il − id)G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
(17)
and
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂rj2
= −
∂V2(s
j
2;µ)
∂aj2
. (18)
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3.2.3 The interbank market at t = 1
At t = 1 all banks start identical with aj1 = A1 and r
j
1 = R. Define the value
function V1(s
j
1;µ) as the maximized expected profits from days 1 and 2,
V1(s
j
1;µ) = max
b
j
1
E1
[
pij1(s
j
1;µ) + V2(s
j
2;µ)
]
. (19)
Profits at day 1 are equal to
pij1(s
j
t ;µ) = i1(µ)b
j
1 + i
l(mj1 + ε
j
1)I
[
mj1 + ε
j
1 < 0
]
−id(rj1 −m
j
1 − ε
j
1)I
[
mj1 + ε
j
1 > r
j
1
]
. (20)
Notice the bank goes to the lending facility if it has an overdraft (mj1 + ε
j
1 < 0)
and not if it does not satisfy the reserve requirement as on day T = 2. Also
notice that, although banks need to know the day of the period, this variable
enters the problem by changing the form of the value function which links the
state to the objective of the bank. This is why it is not included as a state
variable but indexing the function V .
As before, using (1) and taking expectations produces
E1
[
pij1(s
j
1;µ)
]
= i1(µ)b
j
1 − i
l(bj1 −A1 − µ)G
(
bj1 −A1 − µ
)
− id(R+ bj1 −A1 − µ)
[
1−G
(
R+ bj1 −A1 − µ
)]
+ il
b
j
1
−A1−µ∫
−∞
εg (ε) dε+ id
∞∫
R+b
j
1
−A1−µ
εg (ε) dε.
To compute the second term in (19) we make use of the distribution of rj2. Then
E1
[
V2(s
j
2;µ)
]
=
b
j
1
−A1−µ∫
−∞
V2(R, a
j
2;µ)g (ε) dε
+
R+b
j
1
−A1−µ∫
b
j
1
−A1−µ
V2(R+ b
j
1 −A1 − µ− ε, a
j
2;µ)g (ε) dε
+
∞∫
R−b
j
1
−A1−µ
V2(0, a
j
2;µ)g (ε) dε.
The first order condition with respect to bj1 evaluated at b
j
1 = 0 gives
i1(µ) = i
lG (−A1 − µ) + i
d [1−G (R−A1 − µ)]
−
R−A1−µ∫
−A1−µ
∂V2(r
j
2, a
j
2;µ)
∂rj2
g (ε) dε.
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Assuming an interior solution this expression becomes
i1(µ) = i
lG (−A1 − µ) + i
d [1−G (R−A1 − µ)]
+i2(µ) [G (R−A1 − µ)−G (−A1 − µ)] . (21)
The partial derivative of the value function with respect to aj1 is
∂V1(s
j
1;µ)
∂aj1
= i1(µ) +
∞∫
−∞
∂V2(r
j
2, a
j
2;µ)
∂aj2
g (ε) dε = i1(µ) + i2(µ). (22)
What is the value that a bank associates with having an additional unit of
reserves at day 1? This bank can lend that unit on day 1 and on day 2. This
decision will not affect its state on any day and will increase its profits by
i1(µ) + i2(µ). In other words, having an additional unit of reserves on day
1 means, on average, a permanent addition for the balance of the bank and,
therefore, its value is the accumulated expected revenue of that unit for the rest
of the reserve maintenance period. For a single bank, this value is represented
by the sum of the market rates up to the last day of the reserve maintenance
period.
3.2.4 The open market operation at t = 1
The initial level of reserves is injected through an open market operation that
takes place at the beginning of day 1, before the market opens. We have assumed
that the central bank supplies reserves inelastically at the interest rate io through
loans with a maturity of T = 2 days. Also, all banks participating in the open
market operation are identical. They have no funds and have to accumulate R
reserves through the next T = 2 days. The problem for bank j is to choose
the reserves borrowed from the central bank, aj1, to maximize expected profits
for the maturity of the loan, T = 2 days. Because the OMO is conducted
before aggregate uncertainty is resolved, banks take expectations over possible
realizations of the aggregate liquidity drain, µ. These expected profits are,
therefore,
pijomo = E
[
V1(R, a
j
1;µ)
]
− 2ioaj1. (23)
The first order condition of (23) determines the initial level of reserves for
each bank, aj1 as
E
[
∂V1(R,A1;µ)
∂aj1
]
= 2io.
Using (22) and the distribution of aggregate states, implies
io =
1
2
E
[
∂V1(R,A1;µ)
∂aj1
]
= pµ
[
i1(e) + i2(e)
2
]
+(1−pµ)
[
i1(0) + i2(0)
2
]
. (24)
Notice the bank considers itself a small player in the economy so that its bid
in the open market operation does not affect equilibrium rates. The intuition
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from expression (24) should be clear. Banks bid for official reserves up to the
point where the daily marginal cost of those reserves (the OMO rate) equals the
expected average marginal value of those reserves throughout the maturity of
the loan given by the average of the sequence of market rates for each possible
realization of the aggregate state weighted by the probability of occurrence of
those states. In this sense the OMO rate serves as an attractor of the market
rates.
Expression (24) provides an intuition as of how the three official rates,
namely, the lending rate, il, the deposit rate, id, and the OMO rate, io, affect
the demand for reserves at the open market operation and, therefore, influence
the level of excess reserves for the maintenance period. In general, when the
OMO rate is closer to the lending rate than to the deposit rate, commercial
banks understand that reserves are expensive and bid a smaller amount. With
fewer reserves the probability of having an overdraft increases and so does the
market rate on average over the period. Furthermore, using (10), (13), (16) and
(21) we can see how the demand for reserves at the OMO is independent of the
spread between the lending and deposit rates. From (10), (13), and (16) we can
write, respectively,
i2(µ)− i
d =
[
pf (io − id) + (1− pf )(il − id)
]
G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
, (25)
i2(µ)− i
d = pf (io−)id +
[
(il − id)− pf (io − id)
]
G
(
rj2 + b
j
2 − a
j
2
)
, (26)
i2(µ)− i
d = (il − id)G (R2 −A2) , (27)
where both A2 and R2 depend on A1 and are defined in (4) and (5), respectively.
On the other hand, from (21) we can write
i1(µ)− i
d = (il − id)G (−A1 − µ) +
+(i2(µ)− i
d) [G (R−A1 − µ)−G (−A1 − µ)] . (28)
Define the asymmetry coefficient of the interest rate corridor as
α =
io − id
il − id
. (29)
From (24), (25), (26), (27), and (28) it is easy to see that the demand for
funds at the initial OMO, A1, that satisfies (24) only depends on α and not
on the spread (il − id). Therefore, the central bank can control the bid of
banks at the initial OMO by carefully chosen the index of asymmetry α. In
particular, for given values for width of the interest rate corridor (il − id) and
rate of the main refinancing operation, io, the central bank can determine the
combination of rates for the standing facilities, il and id, that ensures its desired
liquidity conditions, A1, in the overnight market. Of course, this choice for A1 is
dependent on the rest of parameters of the model, namely, the level of required
reserves, R, the standard deviation of the liquidity shock, σ, the subjective
probability of a fine-tuning operation, pf , the subjective probability of a liquidity
crisis, pµ, and the mean of the liquidity shock in the event of a liquidity crisis,
e.
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3.3 A numerical approximation
To get a quantitative assessment as of how the asymmetry of the interest rate
corridor affects the demand for excess reserves, we approximate the solution
by means of a numerical exercise. In our numerical example we take io = 3
percent, R = 200, e = −200, pµ = 0.4 and σ = 80. Computations are done for
different combinations of the lending and deposit rates so we explore the effects
of corridors for the overnight rates not centered around the main refinancing
rate. We also assume pf = 1 so that there is a fine-tuning operation for sure.
Below we perform computations for different values of this parameter to assess
the role of the end-of-period fine-tuning operation.
Imagine the central bank of this economy sets the deposit rate at id = 2 per-
cent and the lending rate at il = 4 percent. This would imply a symmetric, 200
basis point corridor for the overnight rate, centered around the rate of the main
refinancing operation. With these parameter values, market participants would
ask for an amount of excess reserves equal to 89 percent of reserve requirements.
3.3.1 The role of the asymmetric corridor
To see the role played by the deposit and lending facilities on the determina-
tion of the demand for reserves at the main refinancing operation, imagine the
central bank keeps the OMO rate constant but shifts the corridor by moving
simultaneously the lending and deposit rate up and down. Figure 7 shows the
excess reserves demanded at the main refinancing OMO for different values of
the asymmetry index of the interest rate corridor defined in (29). Excess reserves
are defined as
ξ =
A1 − (R/T )
R/T
,
that is, they are computed as the difference between the allotment in the OMO
(A1) and daily reserve requirements (R/T ) as a fraction of daily reserve require-
ments. The figure plots the results for three different values of the probability
of the ECB conducting the fine tuning-operation, pf . These values are 0, 0.5
and 1. Because the effect of asymmetry is equivalent for all values of the prob-
ability we can concentrate on the continuous line which depicts excess reserves
for pf = 1. The figure shows there is a negative relation between the demand
for excess reserves and the asymmetry index. As the OMO rate gets closer to
the upper edge of the band (so that the asymmetry index goes to 1), there are
less incentives to demand reserves in the refinancing operation both because
excess reserves are relatively less remunerated, since the spread between the
OMO rate and the deposit rate is large, and reserve deficiencies are relatively
less penalized, since the spread between the lending rate and the OMO rate is
small. Also, the figure shows this relation is highly non lineal.
Figures 7 indicates that, in the event of a sure fine-tuning operation at the
end of the reserve maintenance period, the central bank could eliminate the
autonomous demand for excess reserves leaving interest rates the same range
for fluctuation by maintaining the same spread between the lending and deposit
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rates. For that, the central bank would need to set an asymmetric band around
the OMO rate. As the figure suggests, given the OMO rate of io = 3 percent,
the central bank could have reduced the excess reserves to zero using an interest
rate corridor with index of asymmetry equal to 0.935. For a 200 basis points
width for the corridor the deposit rate should have been id = 1.13 percent and
a lending rate of il = 3.13.
3.3.2 The role of the fine-tuning operation
Figure 7 shows excess reserves for different probabilities of the central bank
conducting the fine-tuning OMO. These probabilities are pf = 0, pf = 0.5 and
pf = 1. Given the prospects of a large aggregate liquidity drain, banks care
about the risk associated with using the lending facility on either of the two
days of the maintenance period. As discussed above, banks will find it more
profitable to ensure against the risk of going to the lending facility by bidding
larger amounts at the initial OMO the closer the rate of the main refinancing
operation is to the deposit rate. What Figure 7 shows is that the rate at which
they want to use this insurance depends on the existence of the fine-tuning
operation at the end of the maintenance period.
First, we start with the case of pf = 0. This means that there will not be a
fine-tuning operation at the end of the reserve maintenance period so that the
only source of funds from the central bank, apart from the standing facilities,
is the OMO performed at the beginning of day t = 1. This particular demand
function presents a very elastic portion at α = pµ = 0.4. Apart from that, the
demand is very inelastic around excess reserves ξ = 2 and ξ = 0. To understand
the shape of this demand function, we can use expression (24) normalized by
subtracting the deposit rate id and dividing by width of the interest rate corridor
(il − id) so that all rates are expressed as the asymmetry index
α =
pµ
2
[
i1(e)− id
il − id
+
i2(e)− id
il − id
]
+
(
1− pµ
2
)[
i1(0)− id
il − id
+
i2(0)− id
il − id
]
. (30)
As argued above, (30) together with expressions (25), (26), (27), and (28) de-
termine the demand for funds at the initial OMO, A1. Thus, banks bid for
reserves at the main refinancing OMO to equate the (normalized) rate of the
main refinancing operation, as defined by the asymmetry index α, with the (nor-
malized) expected value of those reserves during the whole maintenance period,
as captured by the right-hand side of (30).
When pf = 0, the expected value of funds is basically constant and equal to
pµ for all demands for funds at the initial OMO that imply an excess reserve
index between ξ = 2 and ξ = 0. To see this, remember that with probability pµ
banks expect an aggregate liquidity drain as percentage of reserve requirements
of e/(R/T ) = −2 < 0. Therefore, for all demands of funds that do not fully
compensate for that reserve shortage of e/(R/T ), that is, demands which imply
excess reserves indices between ξ = 2 and ξ = 0 two events may happen. On
the one hand, if the aggregate liquidity drain occurs (with probability pµ), there
will be an aggregate liquidity shortage and rates will be close to the lending rate
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on both days of the maintenance period, so that i1(e)  i2(e)  il on expression
(30). On the other hand, if the aggregate liquidity drain does not occur (with
probability 1− pµ), there will be an aggregate excess of reserves and rates will
be close to the deposit rate on both days of the maintenance period, so that
i1(0)  i2(0)  i
d on expression (30). Therefore, for all those demands for
reserves the expected marginal value of funds as measured by the right-hand
side of (30) would be
pµ
2
[
il − id
il − id
+
il − id
il − id
]
+
(
1− pµ
2
)[
id − id
il − id
+
id − id
il − id
]
= pµ.
Notice that, because the size of the liquidity drain, e, is large relative to the
standard deviation of the liquidity shock, σ, the marginal value of funds will be
basically constant at pµ for bids that do not fully compensate the liquidity drain
µ = e. In other words, demands that imply an excess reserve index between
ξ = 2 and ξ = 0 are relatively elastic at the asymmetry index α = pµ. This is
the vertical segment corresponding to the line representing the excess reserves
for pf = 0. Thus, if the asymmetry index is below pµ, funds are cheap and
banks are willing to compensate for most of the possible liquidity drain (up to
the variability in funds associated with the distribution of individual shocks, σ).
On the contrary, if the asymmetry index is above pµ funds are expensive and
banks do not have incentives to demand excess reserves.
In the opposite case, when the fine-tuning operation occurs with certainty
so that pf = 1, the reasoning is different. In that case, the fine-tuning oper-
ation provides a second chance for banks to obtain liquidity deficiencies or to
place excess reserves. Furthermore, the central bank will absorb or provide any
liquidity needed at the same rate of the main refinancing operation, io. This
makes the expected marginal value of funds on any day to be approximately
equal to the rate of the main refinancing operation so that the right-hand side
of (30) would be
pµ
2
[
io − id
il − id
+
io − id
il − id
]
+
(
1− pµ
2
)[
io − id
il − id
+
io − id
il − id
]
= α.
independently on whether the aggregate liquidity drain is realized or not. Thus,
in the model the only consideration for banks is to insure against the risk of
going to the lending facility on the first day of the maintenance period because
of a current account overdraft. Therefore, the demand is relatively inelastic at
that level. The demand for funds for probabilities of the fine-tuning operation
between 0 and 1, are just in between of the two extreme cases.
Figure 8 shows market interest rates on each day of the maintenance period
for a symmetric corridor as a function of the probability that the central bank
conducts the fine-tuning OMO. These computations assume that, ex-post, there
is no aggregate liquidity drainage. To make the figure comparable with the
other figures above, we have computed the relative position of market rates
within the interest rate corridor by subtracting the rate of the deposit facility
id and dividing by width of the interest rate corridor (il − id). In Figure 8
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we call this measure the market asymmetry index. The results agree with the
data in that, in general, for a symmetric corridor interest rates are depressed
for the whole maintenance period as the position of the overnight rate is below
the mid point of the interest rate corridor. Of course, as the probability of the
fine-tuning operation increases, overnight rates also increase. This is because
excess reserves are remunerated at io > id whenever the fine-tuning operation
occurs.
4 Conclusions and policy implications
In periods of financial turmoil, operating frameworks characterized by full al-
lotments and standing facilities, such as the one maintained by the ECB, could
provide incentives for banks to demand larger amounts of excess reserves which
are then deposited at the deposit facility. We have argued that this is not a de-
sirable situation from the point of view of a central bank. In an environment of
financial distress funds do not reach those institutions that need them most and
the central bank looses control of liquidity conditions in the interbank market.
We have built a model in which banks have a strong preference for liquidity
driven by the prospects of tough liquidity conditions in the future. One possible
rationalization of this kind of situation is what Eisenschmidt and Tapking [5]
call a funding liquidity risk premium. For these authors, banks internalize the
liquidity premium they could have to pay in case they are short of liquidity in
the future. This makes them increase their demand for liquidity beyond what
could be explained by just counterparty credit risk.
In our model the demand for excess reserves can be interpreted as the cover-
age bought by banks against the prospective of future tough liquidity conditions.
In this sense, banks use the open market operations and the deposit facility as a
storage device. How much “coverage” they want to secure, for a given value of
the volatility of shocks, will be a function of the price of holding reserves. When
we have full allotment at the main refinancing operation the relative prices of
this “insurance” can be computed as the index of asymmetry α defined by the
relative position of the OMO in the interest rate corridor. Banks can get re-
serves at the OMO rate io. In the event they are short on liquidity and have to
go to the lending facility they will have to pay a premium equal to the spread
between the lending and the main refinancing rate, il − io. If they hold one
unit of excess reserves, they will have to pay an opportunity cost equal to the
difference between the OMO rate and the deposit rate, io − id. Notice that the
demand for funds is endogenous. Because this demand equates the marginal
cost of funds (equal to the OMO rate, io) with the marginal expected value
of those funds throughout the reserve maintenance period the probabilities of
going to the standing facilities are already included in io. Thus, the only way to
affect the demand for excess reserves at the initial open market operation is to
change the relative price of using the storage device. This can only be done by
modifying the index of asymmetry, that is, by moving the relative position of
the OMO rate with respect to the rates of the standing facilities which modifies
23
the spreads il − io and io − id.
In our model, the width of the interest rate corridor does not have any effect
on the demand for reserves as long as the index of asymmetry of the corridor
stays constant. Whether this is true or not in the data is still an open empirical
question. In any case, the model may be a useful starting point to think of
scenarios in which the spread between the rates of the standing facilities does
have an effect on the demand for excess reserves.
Finally, we have analyzed how the existence of a fine-tuning operation on
the last day of the maintenance period interacts with the demand for funds at
the main refinancing operation. Because the fine-tuning OMO fixes the value
of funds when central banks evaluate whether reserve requirements are satisfied
or not, this OMO affects the determination of the expected marginal cost of
reserves throughout the whole maintenance period. Thus, the existence of end
of period fine-tuning operations has implications for the optimal bid of banks at
the main refinancing operation. We have shown how it decreases the elasticity
of demand at the main refinancing OMO.
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Figure 1. Use of the deposit facility as percentage of required reserves
Note: The figure shows the use of the deposit facility as a percentage of required reserves. The sample 
period covers from January 3rd, 2007 until September 23rd, 2009. The area with vertical lines marks the 
period when the spread between the lending and deposit rates was 100 basis points. The area with 
horizontal lines shows the period when the spread between the lending and deposit rate was 150 basis 
points.
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Figure 2. Standing amounts from OMOs and autonomous factors as a percentage 
of required reserves
Note: The figure shows the standing amount of reserves allotted at the OMOs (solid) and autonomous 
factors (dotted) as a percentage of required reserves. The sample period covers from January 3rd, 2007 
until September 23rd, 2009. The area with vertical lines marks the period when the spread between the 
lending and deposit rates was 100 basis points. The area with horizontal lines shows the period when the 
spread between the lending and deposit rate was 150 basis points.
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Figure 3. Spread between Euribor and Eurepo
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Figure 4. Fine-tuning allotment and changes in deposit facility and current account
Note: The figure shows the allotment of the fine-tuning operations performed on the last day of the 11 
reserve maintenance periods covering the period between November 2008 and September 2009. It also 
shows the changes in the use of the deposit facility and in the balance of current accounts between the last 
two days of those reserve maintenance periods. Numbers are as fractions of the use of the deposit facility 
on the penultimate day of the maintenance periods.
Note: The figure shows the spread between the 12-months Euribor and the 12-months Eurepo. The sample 
period covers from January 3rd, 2007 until September 23rd, 2009. The area with vertical lines marks the 
period when the spread between the lending and deposit rates was 100 basis points. The area with 
horizontal lines shows the period when the spread between the lending and deposit rate was 150 basis 
points.
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Figure 5. Spread between Eonia and main refinancing rate
Figure 6. Use of the marginal lending facility as a percentage of required reserves
Note: The figure shows the use of the marginal lending facility as a percentage of required reserves. The 
sample period covers from January 17th, 2007 until July 7th, 2009. The yellow area marks the period when 
the spread between the lending and deposit rates was 100 basis points. The light blue area shows the period 
when the spread between the lending and deposit rate was 150 basis points.
Note: The figure shows the spread between the Eonia and the rate of the main refinancing operations. The 
sample period covers from January 3rd, 2007 until September 23rd, 2009. The area with vertical lines 
marks the period when the spread between the lending and deposit rates was 100 basis points. The area 
with horizontal lines shows the period when the spread between the lending and deposit rate was 150 basis 
points.
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Figure 8. Overnight rates for symmetric corridor
Note: The lines show the asymmetry index for overnight rates on day 1 (solid) and 2 (dashed) 
for a symmetric corridor versus the probability of the central bank conducting a fine-tuning 
operation on the last day of the reserve maintenance period.
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Figure 7. Excess reserves and index of asymmetry
Note: The black line shows the use of the excess reserves as a fraction of reserve requirements 
versus the degree of asymmetry of the interest rate corridor measured as the distance between 
the OMO rate and the deposit rate over the spread between the lending and deposit rate.
